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Creating Suitable Evidence of the
Past? Archaeology, Politics, and
Hindu Nationalism in India from the
End of the Twentieth Century to the
Present
Anne-Julie Etter
1 Stating that archaeology and politics are closely linked is quite trivial. Archaeology has
a double function, whose respective borders tend to overlap: a scientific one, which is
to produce and disseminate knowledge about the past, and an ideological one (Demoule
2020:7). Such interference has been in place since the nineteenth century. Chronology
is important here: archaeology developed as a discipline at the time of nation-building
in Europe. Nations turned to the past to create narratives illustrating their grandeur as
well  as  the prestige  of  their  origins  and achievements.  In  that  regard,  archaeology
helped to construct their historical legitimacy. It  also nurtured European countries’
rivalry on the international stage and accompanied their expansion overseas. It was
thus instrumental in the creation of both national and imperial identities. 
2 The relationships between archaeology and politics have been extensively discussed
and explored since the end of  the twentieth century (Kohl  and Fawcett 1995;  Diaz-
Andreu and Champion 1996;  Meskell 1998;  Meskell  and Preucel 2007;  Hamilakis 2007;
Hamilakis and Duke 2007). The geopolitical context of the time, with the collapse of the
communist bloc and the emergence of new nationalisms, notably in Central and Eastern
Europe,  contributes to explain the development of  this  scholarship,  which has paid
much attention to nationalism and how it  puts archaeological  knowledge to a wide
range  of  uses,  misuses  and  abuses.  Leaders  and  thinkers  of  nationalist  movements
resort to archaeology to sustain their essentialist vision of the nation and its so-called
cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic homogeneity, and to defend the political project
that  is  associated  with  it.  Archaeology  offers  means  to  materialize  concepts  and
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ideological narratives, which are often embedded in mythical roots, into actual places
and objects, and thus give credence to origin stories. 
3 The very materiality of archaeological remains can induce one to think or claim that
they bear  some kind of  self-evidence.  This  is  something quite  common in  the  way
archaeology is conceived of and (mis)used. It  is  as if  material  relics such as stones,
bones,  or potsherds were less doubtful and more reliable than literary works.  They
supposedly  provide  us  with  a  direct  and  unmediated  connection  to  the  past.  It  is
alleged that certitudes and truths about ancient times can be derived from them. This
is of course not true: material remains, just as is the case of any other source, remain
mute as long as one does not strive to make them speak. Archaeological data are based
on analytical frameworks and interpretative concepts, which make them anything but
neutral or objective. Yet, this semblance of objectivity remains attached to archaeology
and  it  accounts  for  the  convenient  allegation  that  its  underlying  political  and
ideological postulates need not be questioned. In addition, “the obvious triviality of
archaeology for  overt  political  action makes it  a  cloaked but  significant  weapon in
struggles  over  the  past”  (McGuire  2008:16).  Its  impact  has  rather  to  do  with  the
symbolic sphere and archaeologists are seldom protagonists in political struggles and
actions.  For all  these reasons,  it  can be tempting to cover up the political  scope of
archaeological research or to pretend to do so. Archaeologist Randall McGuire (2008)
described archaeology “as the secret writing of nationalism” (Pp. 22–8). 
4 There  are  countless  examples  of  how  archaeological  knowledge  and  politics  are
intertwined and how this knowledge is manipulated so that it can enhance national or
nationalist agendas.1 As far as contemporary India is concerned, one case is frequently
mentioned: the demolition by Hindu militants of a sixteenth century-mosque in the
North  Indian  town  of  Ayodhya  in  1992,  as  the  culmination  of  a  dispute  in  which
archaeology came to be largely mobilized.  This  event occurred precisely while  new
concerns were emerging amongst scholars over the linkages between nationalism and
archaeology.  Writing  about  it  a  few  years  later,  Reinhard  Bernbeck  and  Susan
Pollock (1996)  inscribed what they called the “Ayodhya drama” within this  broader
context, stating that “identity building has become a major theme in the contemporary
world with the resurgence of nationalist and ethnic conflicts in the past few years”
(P. S140). However, the case of Ayodhya quickly stood out, since it seemed to exemplify
the  political  bias  of  archaeology  as  pushed  to  its  worst  limits.  At  Ayodhya,  “the
triviality  of  archaeology has become consequential  in  horrifying ways,”  as  McGuire
(2008:26) put it, and interpretations over the past had “real political consequences and
human costs” (Zutshi 2009).2 The destruction of the monument launched violent riots
with a high number of casualties. More than 2000 people, mainly Muslims, were killed
shortly after the demolition of the mosque. Around a decade later, in 2002, communal
killings  took  place  in  Gujarat,  which  was  then  led  by  Narendra  Modi,  after  Hindu
pilgrims died in a train coming back from Ayodhya. 
5 This case is analyzed in this article, which deals more broadly with the nationalist value
and use of archaeology in India since the late twentieth century. In the course of that
period,  the  Sangh  Parivar,  a  body  of  Hindu  nationalist  organizations  led  by  the
Rashtriya  Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),  gained prominence,  including on the  political
stage. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won several state elections at the beginning of
the 1990s and formed a short-lived government after the 1996 general election. The
BJP-led  National  Democratic  Alliance  was  in  power  from  1998  to  2004.  During  the
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following decade, the BJP was the main opposition party, before winning the 2014 and
2019 general  elections.  Hindu nationalist  organizations’  growing prominence in  the
public sphere has entailed a large dissemination of their ideological program centered
around the concept of Hindutva. Hindu nationalists postulate an equivalence between
the nation and the majority population,  the Hindus.  They define Indian identity as
Hindu, excluding other groups or communities, especially Muslims. India is envisioned
as a sacred land, whose boundaries are largely defined by mythology. Modern Indians’
ancestors are supposed to be indigenous to that land and autochthony is key to the
Hindutva  version  of  Indian  history.  Talking  about  nationalism  in  general,
McGuire (2008) stated that it  “often rests on the idea of a golden age of ethnic and
linguistic uniformity and promotes a culture that is supposedly still connected to that
past” (p. 23). The role of archaeology is then to embody this idea of homogeneity and
continuity through the ages, and to make the nation coincide with its territory. This
describes well the way archaeology has been mobilized to serve the Hindutva agenda. 
6 This paper explores how archaeology has accompanied the rise of Hindu ideology and
politics,  showing—if  proof  were  still  needed—that  Indian  past(s)  have  become  a
vigorous and harsh battle arena.3 I first give an overview of the Indian archaeological
stage as it has developed since the nineteenth century, insisting on features that shed
light  on  Hindutva’s  successful  appropriation  of  this  field.  I  then  describe  the
archaeological politics of the BJP through the lens of a project launched in 2020, before
detailing  two examples:  the  Ayodhya dispute  and the  controversies  on  origins  and
identity.  Both  cases  are  in  the  forefront  of  archaeological  and  political  stages  and
illustrate two related uses of archaeology. At Ayodhya, archaeology has been yoked to
the project of erasing, both symbolically and physically, Islamic heritage and the place
of  Islam in  India’s  culture  and landscape,  while  nurturing  the  politics  of  exclusion
through the character of the Other—the invading Muslim. In parallel, archaeological
knowledge has played an instrumental role in the Hindutva project to endow Indians
with what is supposed to be a brilliant and indigenous ancestry. 
 
Archaeology and politics in colonial and postcolonial
India
7 The  Archaeological  Survey  of  India  (ASI)  is  the  main  organization  in  charge  of
archaeological research and the protection of cultural heritage in India.  Part of the
Ministry  of  Culture,  this  body  was  founded  during  the  British  Raj.  Alexander
Cunningham was Archaeological Surveyor between 1861 and 1865. The survey was put
on a  firmer  footing  in  1871,  when it  was  “revived as  a  distinct  department  of  the
government” (ASI 2020). The end of the century was marked by several difficulties4 and
the survey was again restored in 1901 by Lord Curzon, then Vice-Roy. John Marshall’s
Director-Generalship (1902-1928) was marked by a major event: the discovery of the
Indus Valley Civilization. It was first identified at Harappa,5 which was excavated in
1921-1922 under the supervision of Daya Ram Sahni, and Mohenjodaro. These two large
urban settlements displayed impressive remains such as citadel mounds, fortifications
and sophisticated water systems. Contemporaneous with the ancient civilizations of
Egypt  and Mesopotamia,  the Indus Valley Civilization is  one of  the world’s  earliest
urban civilizations. Its discovery was a landmark in world history as well as South Asian
history and archaeology.
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8 Curzon’s impact on the field of archaeology and conservation of monuments in India is
well  known.6 He saw the discovery, documentation, and protection of antiquities as
part of the so-called “civilizing mission” of the colonizers. This feature points to the
close relationship between politics and archaeology during the colonial era. The British
defined the nature and contents of the Indian past and this was a highly significant
instrumentality  of  rulership:  it  enabled  them to  deepen their  knowledge  of  Indian
territories and populations, and better control them (Cohn 1996:10). They appropriated
the Indian past through various means, both symbolic and material: historiographical
tropes,7 archaeological exploration, the constitution of collections and the creation of
museums. In India as in other parts of the world, archaeology acted as an instrument of
power,  legitimizing  the  hegemony  of  imperial  centers  over  colonies  (Diaz-Andreu
2007:210).  Indians were long kept in subaltern roles and excluded from any kind of
responsibilities in that area.8 There was a growing Indianization in the ranks of the ASI
from  the  twentieth  century  onwards,  notably  in  the  field  of  epigraphy.  However,
practical and financial considerations were at stake: it was a way of keeping costs down
(Guha 2015:122). The first Indian to be appointed Director-General was Daya Ram Sahni,
who was in charge from 1931 to 1935.
9 The ASI survived the division of the British Indian Empire. It was maintained in the
Republic  of  India,  whereas  a  Department  of  Archaeology  was  created  in  Pakistan.
Partition  entailed  that  archaeological  assets—sites  and  museum  collections—were
divided between the two new countries.  As the most emblematic sites of  the Indus
Valley Civilization,  such as Harappa,  Mohenjodaro,  and Taxila,  now lay in Pakistan,
extending the ambit of Harappan culture eastward and southward was a matter of high
concern for the new Republic of India. In the 1950s, important sites such as Alamgirpur
(Uttar Pradesh) and Lothal (Gujarat) were excavated and massive exploratory work was
undertaken  in  the  following  decades,  notably  in  Haryana,  Punjab,  and  Gujarat.  It
involved the ASI, but also state archaeological departments, such as the Gujarat State
Department of Archaeology, and universities, like Baroda University. The endeavor was
crowned with success: by the 1990s, around 1,400 Harappan sites had been identified in
India. 
10 A  nation-serving  archaeology  developed  in  Independent  India.  It  was  meant  to
substantiate its politics of secularism and depict India’s cultural unity, as illustrated by
the works of H. D. Sankalia (Guha 2015:28). Archaeology has remained embedded in
national and political concerns since then. The will to demonstrate the triumph of the
nation and shape a narrative of its historical achievements and cultural cohesiveness
continues  to  skew  archaeological  practice  and  theory.  A  similar  position  has  been
endorsed by historians of Indian archaeology.9 This nation-serving archaeology and its
historiography share similarities with British archaeology in colonial India, in terms of
methods  and  aims  (Guha  2015:27–9,  232–40).  Both  rely  on  a  positivist  approach  to
material  remains,  tending  to  view  them  as  valid  and  unquestionable  evidence,
disregarding the fact that archaeological data and knowledge do not exist in nature but
are artefacts of history. 
11 As  for  the  ASI,  its  role  and  scope  have  remained  largely  unchanged.  As  premier
archaeological organization of the country, it is able to pilot large excavations, that is
to say also excavations which are liable to have an impact on the scientific and media
sphere. The spectrum of its activities is much wider than that of any other structure
conducting archaeological research and excavations, such as university departments.
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The ASI draws authority from its  status as a  state organization and simultaneously
regards itself as the guardian of a national material past (Varghese 2019:104). The ASI is
often described as a bureaucratic institution lacking in efficiency and transparency. It
is criticized for not properly managing the 3,678 monuments of national importance
that lie under its supervision. In 2013, a “performance audit” of the ASI conducted by
the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) pointed out several deficiencies, such as the
disappearance  of  more  than  90  of  these  monuments  and  the  lack  of  reliable  and
updated information on many others. Historian Nayanjot Lahiri, who investigated the
action of the ASI over the past 70 years (2017a), underlined other problems such as the
lack of a proper scientific laboratory and the questionable qualifications of people who
were appointed (2017b).  According to her,  “archaeology should be taken out of  the
corridors of the government:” 
There’s no getting away from the government when you do archaeology in
India. In some ways, it is necessary because a lot of funding comes from the
government.  […]  It is  unfortunate  that  the  ASI  is  not  autonomous.  As  a
department of the ministry of culture, it has to go by the political priorities
of the government in power. And that is never a healthy trend. (Lahiri 2017b)
An interaction between archaeology,  politics,  and nationalism has  been at  work  in
many countries. In India, its potentialities and effects have been greatly increased by
the  existence  of  a  structure  such as  the  ASI,  as  Rachel  Varghese (2018)  has  put  it:
“Archaeology,  world  over,  has  had  an  important  role  in  endowing  nationalist
imaginations with materiality and authenticity. In the case of India, this is a role that
has been strengthened to through the bureaucratic authority of the ASI.”10 
12 Given all this, it is little wonder that organizations such as the RSS and BJP have readily
resorted to archaeology as a useful tool to consolidate the concept of Hindutva.
 
A glimpse into Hindutva archaeology: the BJP’s
project to create five iconic archaeological sites
(2020)
13 In February 2020, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman presented the Union budget for
the  year  2020-2021.  She  alluded  to  several  measures  dealing  with  heritage  and
conservation, amongst which the development of five archaeological sites “as iconic
sites with on-site museums” (Sitharaman 2020:21). These sites are all located in states
ruled by the BJP or alliances including the BJP: Rakhigarhi (Haryana), Hastinapur (Uttar
Pradesh), Shivsagar (Assam), Dholavira (Gujarat), and Adichanallur (Tamil Nadu). The
list sheds light on the kind of archaeological policies which are promoted by the BJP
and the way the latter conceives of archaeological knowledge and activities. 
14 Two sites out of the five, Rakhigarhi and Dholavira, are Harappan ones. This illustrates
the  continued  concern  for  the  promotion  of  Indian  Harappan  sites,  which  also
prompted the project of a maritime museum at Lothal, “the Harappan age maritime
site near Ahmedabad” (Sitharaman 2020:21). The case of Adichanallur is different. Over
the  course  of  the  excavations  conducted  by  the  ASI  in  2004-2005,  burial-urns  with
skeletons were exhumed, but the report was not made public and it was only in 2019
that  samples  were  analyzed.  According  to  carbon  dating  results,  Adichanallur  is
believed to  date  back  to  905  BCE-696  BCE,  thus  becoming one of  the  most  ancient
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known sites in Tamil Nadu. In that perspective, the decision to highlight Adichanallur
means that the site “gets its due, finally” (Sudhakar 2020). It should also be interpreted
in the light of another case in Tamil Nadu, the site of Keezhadi, which will be dealt with
at the end of this article. 
15 Hastinapur is described in Hindu texts as the capital of the Kauravas. It was part of the
project on the “Archaeology of the Mahabharata Sites,” led by the ASI in 1950-1952.
This reminds us that texts have guided archaeological exploration in India since the
nineteenth century, with the aim of identifying sites that they mention. Yet, given BJP’s
intention to give material credence to Hindu mythology and history, this general trend
acquires renewed meaning and one can easily understand why a site such Hastinapur
was targeted by the Modi government. Finally, Shivsagar was one of the capitals of the
Ahom Kingdom, which developed in the Brahmaputra Valley from the thirteenth to the
nineteenth centuries.  The  fact  that  its  rulers  got  Hinduized and managed to  resist
Mughal expansion probably has to do with Shivsagar appearing on the top list of iconic
archaeological sites. The choice of an Assamese site is also significant. The National
Register  of  Citizens  (NRC)  was  first  implemented  in  Assam,  a  border  state  with
important  immigration from Bangladesh,  where intense protests  took place against
both  the  NRC  and  the  Citizenship  Amendment  Act.  Adding  Assam  to  the
abovementioned list can be interpreted as a way of symbolizing both the integration of
this Northeastern state into the Republic of India and the central state’s control upon
it, while aligning the province’s history with the general picture of the Indian past that
Hindu nationalists mean to enforce. 
16 Mingling  history  with  mythology,  setting  aside  the  Islamic  components  of  Indian
history: these are enduring characteristics of Hindutva’s politics of archaeology and
they came to light very clearly in Ayodhya.
 
Ayodhya or the climax of the collusion between Hindu
nationalism and archaeology 
17 Ayodhya occupies an important place in Hindu sacred geography, as the city of origin
of the god Rama, and even more so in Hindutva ideology, which promotes Rama as a
prominent figure of the Hindu pantheon as well as a historical figure. The town’s recent
history is linked to the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi dispute. The mosque called Babri
Masjid owes its name to Mughal Emperor Babur, who reigned from 1526 to 1530, even if
it was built by one of his commandants, Mir Baqi. The dispute emerged out of the belief
that the mosque was erected at the exact birthplace of Rama (Ramjanmabhumi), where a
temple dedicated to that god is supposed to have stood before it was destroyed by the
Mughals. It has been the site of communal conflict since the nineteenth century. The
British divided the site into two parts, establishing a kind of compromise which lasted
until 1949, when an idol of Rama was introduced inside the mosque. This occasioned
the closure of the space and several suits were thereafter filed. 
18 In the 1980s, the Hindu nationalist organization called Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP)
launched a campaign to liberate the birthplace of Rama and build a new temple. The
foundations of a Ram temple were laid on land adjoining the Babri Masjid in 1989, while
a vast campaign was organized the following year, including a huge and mediatized
procession from Somnath (Gujarat) to Ayodhya led by the President of the BJP, L. K.
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Advani.  The  project  to  build  a  temple  (mandir)  at  the  place  of  the  mosque figured
prominently in BJP’s campaigns for general elections in 1989 and again in 1991. On
December 6, 1992, the Babri Masjid was demolished by a crowd of Hindu volunteers
called  karsevaks.  A  land  title  case  was  filed  with  the  Allahabad  High  Court,  which
pronounced its verdict in 2010. The site was divided among the three claimants: the
Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara, a group of Hindu ascetics who worship Ram,
and Ram Lalla Virajman, the infant deity, along with the birthplace (Ramjanmasthan),
represented by members of Sangh Parivar organizations. The area under the central
dome was directed to be handed over to Hindu parties. The claimants appealed to the
Supreme Court which, in 2019, ordered the disputed land to be handed over for the
construction of  the Ramjanmabhumi temple,  while  requesting that  the government
give another piece of land to the Sunni Waqf Board to build a new mosque. Modi laid
the foundation stone of the temple on August 5, 2020. 
19 The pro-mandir movement constitutes the backdrop of BJP’s electoral victories in the
1990s and has been central to Hindutva politics since then. Its proponents called upon
archaeology to substantiate the temple thesis through material evidence, thus placing
it “at the heart of a political confrontation” (Ratnagar 2004:239). Braj Basi Lal, Director-
General of the ASI from 1968 to 1972, conducted excavations at Ayodhya in the late
1970s as part of a program entitled “Archaeology of the Ramayana Sites.”11 He detailed
the results of his work in the ASI official publication, Indian Archaeology: A Review. In
1990, he published an article in Manthan, the journal of the RSS, in which he mentioned
an element absent from his previous reports: the discovery of pillar bases of a temple.
This controversial claim was later on transformed into evidence proving the existence
of  a  temple  under  the  mosque,  along with other  so-called  discoveries  made in  the
course  of  land-leveling  operations  in  June  and  July  1992.  Even  if  the  Ramayana
archaeological  project  was  not  framed  within  Hindutva  logics,  it  was  successfully
mobilized by the Sangh Parivar while orchestrating the Ramjanmabhumi movement.
This  marked  an  important  step  in  “Hindutva’s  epistemological  appropriation  of
archaeology’s discursive legitimacy to pursue its divisive politics” (Chadha 2011:70). 
20 The destruction launched debates among archaeologists regarding excavation methods
and  what  constitutes  facts  and evidence  in  archaeology.  Dhaneshwar  Mandal,  for
instance,  examined all  available  data  and scrutinized  the  validity  of  the  purported
discoveries. He stressed that the stratigraphic context of the finds had not been taken
into account (Guha-Thakurta 2004:276). The “new” and “fresh” discoveries, as he called
them (Mandal 1993), were nonetheless presented at the World Archaeological Congress
organized in New Delhi in 1994. Archaeologists such as B. B. Lal, M. N. Deshpande and B.
K.  Thapar  used  this  event  as  a  forum  to  promote  evidence  in  favor  of  the
Ramjanmabhumi Temple (Guha-Thakurta 2004:364, note 25). After the success of the
BJP-led  National  Democratic  Alliance  at  the  1999  general  election,  the  issue  of
excavations grew in importance. Ordered by the Allahabad High Court in 2002, they
were conducted by the ASI the year after. The excavation report was submitted by the
ASI to the High Court in 2003. It guided the Supreme Court’s ultimate verdict in 2019,
even  though  it  has  given  way  to  a  wide  range  of  criticisms,  dealing  both  with
methodology and the interpretation of the finds. 
21 According  to  the  ASI  report,  there  is  evidence  of  a  temple  under  the  demolished
mosque. This was a crucial element in the subsequent legal settlement of the dispute.
Yet, only a few lines were devoted to this topic in the excavation report, which was
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edited by Buddha Rashmi Mani and Hari Manjhi.12 It is referred to at the very end of the
document which, unlike the rest of it, is not signed, through the mention of remains
presenting the distinctive features of North Indian temples, namely a massive structure
(of which only a western wall  was found),  pillar bases and architectural  fragments.
Archaeologists  like  Dhaneshwar  Mandal  and  Shereen  Ratnagar (2007),  as  well  as
Supriya Varma and Jaya Menon (2010), questioned the kind of evidence that was used
and objected to the results. Varma and Menon reached a different conclusion with the
same  pieces  of  evidence  and  interpreted  them  as  pointing  to  smaller  mosques  or
Buddhist  stupas.  They  held  that  a  mosque,  possibly  dating  back  to  the  thirteenth
century, was underneath the Babri Masjid and that its western wall had been used for
the  foundation  of  the  latter.  Varma  and  Menon’s  reading  of  the  excavation  was
informed by the fact that they had attended it as observers on behalf of the Sunni Waqf
Board.  They had then warned against  a  series  of  shortcomings in the creation and
documentation of archaeological record, which did not follow the basic methods and
rules of the discipline. They contributed to the filing of 14 complaints between May and
June  2003,  having  to do  for  example  with  selective  collection  of  artifacts  and
differential recording of material from the same deposits; a major concern had to do
with the creation of evidence regarding the pillar bases (Varma and Menon 2019). As a
result of these complaints, the director of the excavations, B. R. Mani, was replaced
with H. Manjhi. 
22 As an anthropologist studying archaeology in postcolonial India, Ashish Avikunthak13
(2019) described the 2003 excavation as “the most unusual excavation in the history of
archaeology.”  In  any  case,  it  was  unique  in  the  history  of  the  ASI.  The  site  was
excavated from March to August, that is to say a very short period of time compared to
the normal duration of works in sites of a similar kind. More than 50 personnel from
the ASI as well as 130 laborers took part in it. They worked in difficult conditions (long
hours,  little  rest,  extreme weather  conditions,  close  surveillance and scrutiny from
various  actors—observers  and nominees  of  the  claiming parties,  police,  media)  and
were not allowed to talk about the excavation.14 The drafting of the report took place in
highly peculiar conditions as well. It was written in 10 days, right after the excavation
ended.  This  stands in sharp contrast  to the considerable amount of  work and time
which is commonly necessary for an excavation team to analyze all finds and compile
them into a report. Only a few people from the ASI were allowed to see the report: it
had  the  “life  of  a  top  secret  state  file  rather  than  an  archaeological  report”
(Avikunthak 2019). 
23 Excavation  at  Ayodhya  departed  greatly  from  the  ASI’s  usual  practices  and  more
generally from the founding principles of archaeological work. Rachel Varghese (2019)
argued that this was due to the fact that it was ordered—and actually controlled—by
the High Court of Allahabad. The judiciary intervened at all stages. It formulated the
research question as to whether there was a Hindu structure below the mosque and
whether  the  mosque  was  constructed  after  the  temple  was  demolished.  It  gave
directives  on  how  to  conduct  excavations  (time,  duration,  extent,  location)  and  to
collect,  document,  and  interpret  finds.  Such  interference  meant  that  the  judiciary
influenced  the  process  of  knowledge  production  and  controlled  the  nature  of  the
evidence that was created. Simultaneously, it relied on the expertise of the ASI—itself
deriving from its institutional stature—to guarantee the validity and credibility of the
report.  The judicial  institution deprived the ASI  of  the effective authority  over the
excavation, which gave way to conflicts of interest between them. In the whole affair,
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the ASI did not have much choice but do what it was asked to do. Yet, the Ayodhya case
revealed how much the judiciary’s and ASI’s vision of expertise and archaeology was
similar,  archaeological  work  being  considered  and  practiced  as  a  truth-finding
enterprise leaving little space for contrasted interpretations. It  brought to light the
“ASI’s  positivist  notions regarding archaeological  practice  and its  claim to superior
knowledge and authority deriving from its location as a statist bureaucratic/scientific
institution” (Varghese 2019:103). It therefore stands as a good illustration of the role
the ASI has played in the production of national(ist) pasts in India. There were scholars
who criticized the methods of the excavation and refuted the ASI’s conclusions, but
efforts  were  made  to  control  academic  debate  by  circumscribing  it  within  judicial
limits.15 
24 Whatever the circumstances of the whole dispute may be, it certainly represents an
apex in the disfigurement of  archaeology through ideological  aims.  It  demonstrates
how pieces of evidence are created so as to give credit to preconceived views, debasing
archaeology  from  its  disciplinary  standards.  It  displays  the  irruption  of  faith,
imagination, and belief into the domain of history and archaeology, whose scientific
groundings are thus compromised. Tapati  Guha-Thakurta (2004) further argued that
“archaeology,  even when it  has been the most flamboyantly used in defense of  the
Ramjanmabhumi claims, weighs lightly on the main body of the Hindutva discourse and
on the  kinds  of  popular  Hindu histories  of  Ayodhya it  has  nurtured” (P. 280).  This
suggests  that  archaeological  intricacies  remain  in  the  hands  of  politicians  and
specialists, even though the issue is used to agitate the crowds and does indeed have
enormous  public  resonance.  Commenting  upon the  Allahabad  High  Court’s  verdict,
Romila Thapar (2010) remarked that it “has annulled respect for history and seeks to
replace history with religious faith.”16 She warned against the creation of a dangerous
precedent in law courts and the probable emergence of other “janmasthans.” The 2019
Supreme  Court  order  was  followed  by  attempts,  on  account  of  various  Hindu
organizations, to free places of worship or edifices from the Muslim hold and claim
them as Hindu.17 
25 The  Babri  Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi  dispute  shows  how  much  the  Hindu  nationalist
definition of Indian identity depends on the simultaneous construction of an “Other,”
stated  to  be  radically  different:  the  Muslim—and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  Christian.
Muslims  are  vilified  as  the  villains  of  Indian  history  and  as  oppressors.  They  are
presented  as  invaders,  foreigners,  alien  to  Indian  values  and  culture.  Hence  the
importance of asserting and proving that, contrary to them, Hindus are indigenous to
Indian soil.
 
Who are Indians’ ancestors? Archaeology and the
question of origins 
26 Indigeneity  or  nativism  is  central  to  Hindutva  ideology.  It  goes  along  with  the
promotion of  the antiquity and superiority of  those who are designated as modern
Indians’  ancestors:  the Aryans.18 The mobilization of  archaeology in support  of  this
myth of origin exemplifies the extent to which Hindutva supporters have efficiently
managed to appropriate archaeological data as powerful resources. 
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27 The claim that Aryans are indigenous to the Indian subcontinent is also known as the
“Out of India Theory.” It implies that Indo-European languages originated in India and
spread to other areas from there. From this perspective, Harappans are considered as
linguistically Indo-Aryans. This theory further implies that the Vedic period is much
older than what is generally accepted. Indian civilization’s earliest achievements are
made  to  date  back  to  the  purported  Vedic  Indus-Sarasvati  Civilization,  which  was
devised to Aryanize the Indus Valley Civilization. These postulates go against the works
of many historians, linguists, archaeologists, both Indian and non-Indian, and have led
to  extensive  criticism  amongst  Indian  professional  historians.  Yet,  this  version  of
Indian  history  has  acquired  growing  credibility  and  visibility,  including  in  school
textbooks and museums (Markovits 2006:76). 
28 It has gained prominence since the late twentieth century, as a direct outcome of the
rise  of  Hindu fundamentalism and BJP’s  ascendancy to  power.  This  ideological  and
political  context  favored  the  production,  expression,  and  circulation  of  ideas
illustrating and reinforcing Hindutva ideology. The Ramjanmabhumi movement seems
to  have  opened  a  breach  favorable  to  the  diffusion  of  Hindu  nationalist  views
pertaining to origins and identity. Editorial activity on Aryans flourished shortly after
the  demolition  of  the  Babri  Masjid:  a  sizeable  number  of  works  dealing  with  their
origins was published in 1993 and the years following—notably by Voice of India,  a
publishing  house  serving  the  development  of  Hindutva  ideology.  Hindutva  theses
regarding the nation’s origins have circulated widely since then, including amongst
scholars  not  officially  associated  with  the  Hindutva  nebula  or  interested  in  such
matters beforehand. This can be analyzed in terms of opportunism.19 It also has to do
with various pressure and coercion measures imposed on scholars and intellectuals
who express divergent viewpoints. Mention should be made of the specific case of the
ASI. As representatives of a state institution, ASI’s employees do not have much room
to maneuver and, in many cases, may do no more than what is expected of them—
which does not mean that some of them, including high officials,  do not adhere to
Hindutva ideology or rally to it in search of promotion through political patronage.
Furthermore,  the  ASI’s  institutional  stature  somehow  protects  it  from  criticisms
coming from the outside. It holds considerable power over archaeological research in
India,20 and this can deter archaeologists—both Indian and foreign—from expressing
disapproval of its activities too overtly. 
29 The Hindutva narrative of Indian history spread in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the
meantime, it has been refined, notably thanks to archaeology. To describe this process,
one has to step back a few decades. Colonial Indology contributed to the emergence and
popularization  of  a  racial  theory  of  Indian  civilization,  which  depicted  Aryans  as
representatives  of  a  superior  civilization  they  supposedly  imposed  upon  the
subcontinent’s aborigines, notably the Dravidians.21 The Aryan conquerors, followers of
the Rig Veda, were supposed to have come from the Iranian plateau around 1500 BCE.
The discovery of the Indus Valley Civilization brought new elements to the picture.
Aryans’ so-called superiority was outshined by the sophistication and antiquity of the
great  city  builders  of  Harappa  and  Mohenjodaro.22 The  disappearance  of  the  Indus
Valley  Civilization  was  a  matter  of  importance,  since  one  explanation  was  that  it
collapsed because of the arrival of the Aryans: it thus seemed to corroborate the idea of
Aryan  conquest  or  invasion.  The  origins,  ethnic  features,  and  end  of  the  newly
exhumed civilization were largely discussed by archaeologists,  but also intellectuals
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and  nationalists  of  various  horizons.  Very  shortly  after  Marshall  announced  the
discovery of the Indus Valley Civilization in 1924, it was integrated into Indian, Tamil,
and  Hindu  nationalists’  narratives,  encouraging  a  racialized  quest  for  founders
(Ramaswamy 2001). 
30 Marshall and other archaeologists set the tone in asserting that the Indus civilization
was Pre-Aryan or Non-Aryan. Indian nationalists acknowledged it was pre-Aryan, while
stressing that India emerged out of a harmonious synthesis between its Aryan and non-
Aryan  elements—the  idea  of  migration,  implying  interactions  between  Aryans  and
indigenous settlers, being preferred to that of invasion. Tamil nationalists designed a
different pattern, describing the Indus civilization as Dravidian, and more specifically
Tamil. As the Tamil nationalist movement aimed at countering “colonial and Aryanist
assertions  about  the  barbaric  backwardness  of  Dravidian  India,”  Indus  Valley
Civilization  remains  were  displayed  “as  concrete  proof  of  the  antiquity  and
primordiality  of  Tamil  speakers  who  were  authorised  as  the  original  ‘civilized’
inhabitants of India,  the creators of its first ‘civilization’” (Ramaswamy 2001:108–9).
According to Tamil nationalists,  Aryans were the barbaric destroyers of India’s first
civilization,  which  had  spread  from  South  to  North.  They  incorporated  Harappan
material remains into their demonstration of Tamil antiquity, which had so far relied
mainly on Sangam poems.23 
31 As soon as  the late  1920s,  Hindu nationalists  elaborated their  own strategies.  They
proved  concerned  to  seize  the  foundational  Indus  Valley  Civilization  and  also  “to
salvage  and  recuperate  the  glorious  Aryan”  (Ramaswamy  2001:125).  The  “Hindu-
Aryanist  nationalist  project”  (Ramaswamy  2001:128)  was  indeed  challenged  by  a
discovery which seemed to  undermine the role  of  the Vedas in the constitution of
Indian civilization and that of the Aryans as its procreators—and promote in their place
another “Other,” the barbarous Dravidian. Authors close to Hindu nationalism’s sphere
of influence dismissed the identification of the Indus Valley Civilization as pre-Aryan,
non-Aryan,  or  Dravidian  and  stated  that  it  displayed  influence  of  Hindu/Aryan
civilization. They pushed back the chronological limits of the latter, asserting that the
Rig Veda was contemporary, if not earlier, to the Indus Valley Civilization, and depicted
Harappan remains as material evidence of what is described in the sacred text. 
32 This  launched  a  quest  for  relationships  between Sanskrit  literature  and  Harappan
material culture, which does not rely on scientific foundations.24 Harappan civilization
presents  features  that  are  absent  from  the  Rig  Veda,  and  vice  versa.  To  create
connections between them, archaeologists and scholars “with a nationalist bent” or
“taking the Hindutva position,” as Ratnagar (2007:371) called them, have resorted to
means such as ascribing Harappan seals to some Indo-Aryan language and identifying
Vedic fire altars and horses in Harappa remains.25 In the early 1990s,  archaeologist
Shikaripura Ranganath Rao, renowned for his excavations at Lothal, claimed to have
found there “evidence of fire altars used in Vedic sacrifice and Vedic deities and myths
in the images on the seals,” while reverting to “his old theory that the language of the
Harappan seal inscriptions is a variety of Sanskrit” (Ratnagar 2007:369).26 Kalibangan
(Rajasthan) was excavated in the 1960s: the Harappan fire hearth was analyzed as a
Vedic fire-altar, notably by B. B. Lal in publications dated 1984 and 2003. At Sukortada
(Gujarat),  excavated at  the same period,  the presence of  horse bones enabled A.  K.
Sharma to link this Harappan site with Aryans (Chadha 2011:72). Excavations began at
Dholavira in the early 1990s under the supervision of Ravindra Singh Bisht, who ended
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his career as Joint Director General of the ASI. This site, one of those designated by the
BJP to become archaeological icons, has been interpreted “as a Vedic town (whatever
that may mean), even though the RgVeda has nothing to do with the Rann or the Kutch
mainland” (Ratnagar 2007:371). 
33 These  works,  along with others  of  a  similar  vein,  nurtured the  creation of  a  “new
archaeo-ethnic category—the Vedic Harappans” (Chadha 2011:59). At the same time,
the Aryan invasion/migration hypothesis, problematic to Hindutva ideology in that it
implies  that  Aryans  were  foreigners  to  the  subcontinent,  was  rejected.  During  the
1990s, several publications came out to dismiss the idea that Aryans migrated from the
West,  claiming  instead  that  they  were  indigenous  to  India.27 A  project  meant  to
Aryanize the Indus civilization also emerged at the end of the 1980s. The Deen Dayal
Research  Institute  and  Voice  of  India,  both  “active  arms  of  the  Sangh  Parivar,”
organized a symposium at New Delhi in 1993 to take it “firmly into the public sphere of
the Indian polity” (Chadha 2011:71). A key element of this Aryanization process was the
invention of the Indus-Sarasvati Civilization, Sindhu Sarasvati Sabhyata in Sanskrit. The
river Sarasvati is mentioned in the Rig Veda and other Vedic texts as a powerful river,
which later dried up. By the late twentieth century, it came to be depicted by Hindutva
ideologues  as  the  center  of Harappan  culture  through  its  identification  with  the
Ghaggar-Hakra, a monsoon-fed river which flows through India and Pakistan. 
34 This  attribution  drew  on  colonial  Indology  as  well  as  postcolonial  geology  and
archaeology (Chadha 2011). Recent geological work had pointed to the importance of
the Ghaggar-Hakra and correlated it to the Sarasvati.  In parallel,  several decades of
archaeological investigation had extended Harappan civilization’s geographical sphere,
shifted it away from the Indus Valley and established the importance of the Ghaggar-
Hakra area, while establishing links between Harappans and Vedic Aryans. Geological
and archaeological data enabled the promoters of Indus-Sarasvati Civilization to give it
the trappings of an objective scientific fact, which facilitated its dissemination: “Soon,
even archaeologists  who were not  part  of  the Hindutva ideological  formation were
convinced by these rhetorical moves and began calling the Harappan civilisation the
Indus-Sarasvati Civilisation” (Chadha 2001:72). This “new cultural artefact” (Markovits
2006:75–6) conveniently packed all Hindutva arguments into one concept. Transferring
the homeland of the foundational civilization from the Indus Valley to the area around
the Sarasvati / Ghaggar-Hakra was a means to install it within Indian borders—which
had  been  a  constant  concern  since  Partition—and  also  to  integrate  Indus  remains
within the orbit of Vedic Hinduism and make Aryans autochthonous. 
35 BJP’s electoral success meant that Hindutva perspectives on Indian history and identity
could now be translated into ambitious state-sponsored projects. A case in point was
the Sarasvati Heritage Project (SHP), launched by the ASI in 2002 when the BJP-led NDA
was in power. It propelled a multidisciplinary study of the river (archaeology, history,
pedology,  hydrology,  geomorphology,  paleobotany,  etc.),  combined  with  a  plan  to
transform archaeological sites into tourist attractions. Some of these sites had already
been  excavated,  like  Dholavira,  Kalibangan,  Rakhigarhi,  and  Banawali;  others  were
excavated for the first time on a large scale, such as Dhera and Bhirrana. The project
was headed by the Joint Director of the ASI, while its Advisory Committee was chaired
by the BJP Minister of Tourism and Culture, Jagmohan. Senior archaeologists of the ASI
—some of whom had been instrumental in the elaboration of the Vedic Harappans—
played a key role in the setting up of the SHP, and part of the Advisory Committee’s
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members  were  close  to  the  Hindutva  movement  (Chadha  2011:73–4).  The  main
objective  was  to  “produce  credible  data  of  indigeneity in  order  to  scientifically
demonstrate that the Rig Vedic Aryans were the authors of the Harappan civilization”
(Chadha 2011:74). The difference with earlier investigations lied in the fact that the
wish—and will—to correlate Vedic literary remains,  Harappan material  remains and
the Sarasvati/Ghaggar-Hakra now unfolded within a vast and comprehensive project,
benefiting from the support  of  government and the allocation of  specific  funds.  As
Chadha argued, the very political and ideological orientation of the SHP also explained
why it was short-lived. After the NDA’s defeat in 2004, the United Progressive Alliance
government  put  an  end  to  the  project,  whose  funding  was  cut.  The  ambition,
nevertheless, remained intact and got revived when the BJP returned to power. Soon
after  its  victory  in  2014,  the  topic  resurfaced,  encouraging  the  ASI  to explore  and
excavate sites around the Ghaggar-Hakra river (Vishnoi 2014). 
36 Initiatives were also launched at state levels, as illustrated by the Haryana Sarasvati
Heritage  Development  Board  (HSHDB).  It  was  constituted  by  the  Government  of
Haryana in 2015, with Manohar Lal Khattar as chairman. This BJP politician, former RSS
pracharak, became Haryana Chief Minister in 2014. The aims are to rejuvenate the river
and ensure a regular flow of  fresh water into it,  as  well  as  develop research on it,
restore  heritage  sites  that  are  located  on  its  banks  and  promote  cultural  heritage
relating to the river. The theory of the Indus Sarasvati Civilization explicitly forms the
background of the program: “World oldest literature called Rigveda and other Vedic
literature were created on the bank of this River, which placed India in the position of
‘Vishvaguru’. It reflects the continuity of great Indian value system and glorious past of
Sarasvati  Sindhu civilization to the present age” (HSHDB 2020).  In 2019,  the HSHDB
approved of 11 projects for the revival and development of the river. 
37 Mainstream scholarship has long rejected the Hindutva historical narrative, but the
gap between the two keeps widening as new data further undermine the latter. This
was the case of  two articles published in 2019,  respectively in Cell  and Science.  One
details  the  first  analysis  of  the  sequenced  genome  of  an  Indus  Valley  Civilization
individual, based on the DNA from a woman’s skeleton found at Rakhigarhi (Shinde et.
al. 2019). As stated in the title, the individual in question “lacks ancestry from steppe
pastoralists  or  Iranian  farmers,”  and  rather  fits  as  a  mixture  of  people  related  to
ancient Iranians and Southeast Asian hunter-gatherers. The second article, signed by
more than 90 co-authors, deals with “The Formation of Human Populations in South
and Central Asia” (Narasimhan et al. 2019). Based on genetic analysis of more than 500
people who lived over the past 8,000 years, mostly from Central Asia and northernmost
South  Asia,  it  concludes  that  the  modern  South  Asian  population results  from the
mixing of diverse groups, such as South Asian hunter-gatherers, Iranian farmers and
Steppe pastoralists. Genetic data presented in both papers confirmed well-established
but still  debated facts: the Indus Valley Civilization people was completely different
from  the  Vedic  people;  Indo-Aryans  followed  Harappans  chronologically  as  a
consequence  of  Steppe  migration;  Indo-European  languages  spread  from  Eurasian
steppes;  Steppe  ancestry  erupted  into  India  during  the  first  half  of  the  second
millennium BCE (2000-1500 BCE). 
38 Yet,  a  somewhat  different  picture  was  reported  in  Indian  media—newspapers
headlines,  television and Twitter  feeds  (Shahane 2019).  The way these  studies  were
accounted  for  was  rather  confused.  It  seemed  that  media  misrepresented  the
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conclusions  to  suit  Hindutva  political  narrative  and  its  nativist  assertions
(Daniyal 2019). Indian co-authors of the articles contributed to the confusion. A press
conference took place in New Delhi on September 6,  2019,  the day after the online
publication of  the article  in Cell,  which coincided with the publication of  the other
article. Vasant Shinde, archaeologist and Vice-Chancellor of Pune’s Deccan College, one
of  the  main  contributors  of  the  Cell article  and  co-author  of  the  one  in  Science ,
presented the Rakhigarhi findings. Niraj Rai, head of the Ancient DNA Lab at the Birbal
Sahni  Institute  for  Paleosciences  Lucknow,  who co-authored both articles,  was  also
present. In this conference and later interviews, both scientists presented conclusions
that contradicted the results of the studies, even advancing the Out of India theory.
Shinde  insisted  on  the  indigenous  nature  of  the  ancient  population  of  India.  He
explained that new genetic data dismissed the Aryan migration/invasion theory and
that the Harappans were the Vedic people and spoke Sanskrit. Rai was more careful
when  it  came  to  equate  the  Indus  Valley  Civilization  with  the  Vedic  culture
(Daniyal 2019).  These  controversial  comments  were  criticized  by  some  other
contributors to the studies,  who distanced themselves from the views expressed by
their Indian colleagues. The BJP and its allies reject new genetic data as threatening to
their  ideological  construction:  as  a  result,  “Indian  researchers  in  government-
supported  institutions  muddy  the  waters  of  debate”  (Shahane 2019)  or,  to  put  it
differently, “scientists and writers are allowing themselves to be intimidated by the
current political ecosystem” (Rajendran 2019). 
39 The Science paper also sheds light on the origin of Dravidian languages. One scenario
which is put forward is that proto-Dravidian was spread by peoples of the Indus Valley
Civilization. Another possibility is mentioned: proto-Dravidian derived from peninsular
South Asia. In parallel, new developments occurred on the Tamil Nadu archaeological
stage with the documentation of a site a few kilometers away from Madurai, Keezhadi.
The first phase of excavations, undertaken by the ASI, started in 2015. The site soon
proved to be of major importance, since it presented features characteristic of an urban
civilization  (brick  structures,  continuous  constructed  walls,  drainage  network
structure,  furnaces,  tanks)  and its  artifacts  were  ascribed to  the  Sangam period.  If
Sangam  literature  points  to  urban  civilization  in  Tamil  Nadu,  there  was  no
archaeological evidence for it so far. In that respect, as Amarnath Ramakrishna, the ASI
superintendent  archaeologist  at  the  site,  explained  in  2017,  Keezhadi  could  shed
considerable light on Tamil culture and history (Saradha 2017). 
40 In spite of these promising results—or precisely because of them—difficulties emerged.
The Central government withheld approval for the third season of excavations. This
decision was severely criticized by Tamil Nadu’s polity and approval was granted. But
before the third phase started, the ASI issued an order transferring Ramakrishna to
Assam  and,  later  on,  gave  up  the  excavations.  The  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu
Department  of  Archaeology  took  over  in  2018.  A  report,  entitled  Keeladi:  An  Urban
Settlement of Sangam Age on the Banks of the River Vaigai, was published in 2019.28 Carbon
sample analysis pushed back the chronology of the Sangam era, with artifacts dated to
580  BCE.  Findings  also  hinted  at  a  potential  continuity  in  script  with  Indus  Valley
Civilization remains. The expression “graffiti marks” is used by scholars to refer to a
kind of script which survived between the disappearance of the Indus script and the
emergence  of  Brahmi  script.  More  than  1,000  graffiti  sherds  were  recovered  from
Keezhadi. Tamil-Brahmi inscribed potsherds were recovered as well, and the date of
this  ancient  Tamil  script  was  pushed  back  to  the  sixth  century  BCE.  These  results
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represented a strong challenge and affront to both the ASI and Central Government.
Whereas  the  papers  published  in  Cell and  Science brought  further  evidence  that
Hindutva  theories  on  Indian  ancient  history  were  erroneous,  Keezhadi  findings
presented yet “another thorn in the BJP’s views that the Vedic people were unique”
(Muralidharan 2019). 
41 To  fully  understand  what  happened  at  Keezhadi,  one  should  bear  in  mind  Tamil
nationalists’  ancient  claims  that  the  Indus  Valley  Civilization  was  Dravidian.  This
narrative stands in sharp divergence with the one promoted by Hindutva circles and
this  is  reinforced by  the  opposition between the  Tamil  Nadu state  and the central
government. This episode also helps us to understand the choice of Adichanallur for
becoming an iconic site. It is somehow a way of making up for the ASI’s volte-face in
Keezhadi through the promotion of Tamil history and archaeology in Tamil Nadu. To
BJP’s eyes, nevertheless, Adichanallur is a much less dangerous site than Keezhadi and
its remains hinting to a sophisticated urban civilization with a potential connection to
Harappan civilization.  As  for  Rakhigarhi,  it  can seem ironic  that  Modi  government
chose to shift to the fore the very site which has genetically invalidated the existence of
links  between  Harappans  and  Vedic  people.  Considered  the  other  way  round,  this
decision  stands  as  an  embodiment  of  BJP’s  capacity  to  muzzle  archaeological  and




42 From the standpoint  of  Hindutva fundamentalists,  archaeology is  a  highly  valuable
tool:  it  enables  them to  strengthen  their  ideological  construction,  which  is  largely
embedded in literature and mythology, by endowing it with material, territorial, and
empirical  reality  as  well  as  scientificity.  Such  a  legitimization  is  key  to  the
dissemination  and  growing  ascendancy  of  their  definition  of  the  Indian  nation,
identity, and history. As shown in this article, Hindutva organizations and leaders have
become  experts  at  the  art  of  manipulating  archaeological  data  with  the  aim  of
advancing their political agenda. Distortion and creation of evidence are resorted to as
routine practices, along with the promotion of archaeological activity in accordance
with Hindutva views and the setting aside and curbing of any kind of data or work
which could threaten them.
43 Archaeology accompanied the rise and eventual success of Hindu politics. The claim
may  even  be  advanced  that  it  somehow  contributed  to  this  rise  through  the
Ramjanmabhumi movement, which constituted a major step in the appropriation of
archaeological  discourse  by  Hindutva  organizations.  More  generally,  the  period
stretching from the late 1980s to the beginning of the twenty-first century is a turning
point  in  the  linking  up  of  archaeology  and  Hindutva,  with  the  development  of  a
foundational case, the Ayodhya dispute, in all its phases—pre-demolition, demolition,
and lawsuit—and the setting up of theoretical constructions such as the assumption of
Aryans being indigenous and its refinement into the Indus Sarasvati Civilization. BJP’s
defeat in 2004 meant that some projects were ended or paused, but solid foundations
had been laid in the preceding years and relationships between archaeology and BJP
could easily be amplified in the aftermath of the 2014 general election. 
Creating Suitable Evidence of the Past? Archaeology, Politics, and Hindu Nati...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
15
44 Hindu  majoritarianism  has  gained  pervasive  prevalence  in  the  political  and  public
sphere and its version of Indian history permeates, to an increasing degree, education
and research institutions, such as universities and museums. The ASI has certainly been
instrumental  in  the  successful  intrusion  of  Hindutva  organizations  into  the
archaeological  field.  In  many  instances,  the  ASI  as  an  institution  as  well  as  its
employees  had  no  choice  but  to  satisfy  BJP’s  requests.  Nonetheless,  this  raises  the
question of why a good number of scholars and archaeologists have been involved in
the creation of suitable evidence of a Hindu past, either actively or through omission.
This is a delicate topic. A much deeper analysis, attentive to each case’s specificities,
would  be  necessary  to  disentangle  a  complex  series  of  parameters  pertaining  to
individual preferences and professional constraints. What can be said, at this stage, is
that a panel of options, not necessarily exclusive from one another, are at play, such as
sympathy with or adherence to Hindutva ideology, opportunism, and self-censorship
on  account  of  institutional  affiliation  or  intimidation  measures,  or  for  fear  of
retaliation. 
45 Archaeology in India has long been closely tied to politics, as illustrated by the use and
promotion of archaeological research by British colonial power and the development of
a  nation-serving  archaeology  after  Independence.  Such  a  political  mobilization  has
from the start been favored by the existence of an institution like the ASI, controlling
archaeological  activity  on  a  large  scale  and  having  strong  connections  with
government. Indian archaeology also displays an enduring tendency to use texts as a
guiding  principle  for  research,  with  a  concern  for  establishing  modern  Indians’
ancestry—including by linking material  culture with ethnicity.  Hindutva supporters
could  draw  on  these  institutional  and  scientific  characteristics,  which  they  have
amplified  and perverted to  match their  own goals.  This  background contributes  to
explaining why they managed to appropriate archaeology quickly and efficiently and
turn it to serve their politics of exclusion. 
46 Given how strategically important archaeology is in the making of nation(s) in India,
one can wonder with Sumathi Ramaswamy (2001:144) why the discipline, from a social
and  institutional  point  of  view,  still  holds  a  marginal  and  precarious  place  in  the
country. 
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1. Ranging from the end of the eighteenth century till today, they relate to all parts of the world
and all kinds of political regimes. Archaeology, for instance, played a role in the building of the
nation in nineteenth century-Denmark, in reaction to the crisis induced by significant territorial
loss as well as to the sociopolitical evolutions deriving from the abolition of absolute monarchy
(Sorensen 1996). Also worthy of mention are the creation of national symbols using indigenous,
particularly  Aztec,  images  in  Mexico  during  the  authoritarian  regime  of  Porfirio Diaz
(Valiant 2018), and the use of archaeology in Nazi Germany (Arnold 1990; 2006).
2. Zutshi,  Chitralekha.  2009.  “Debating  the  Past:  Academic  and  Popular  Histories  in  India.”
Perspectives on History, December 1. Retrieved on December 3, 2020 (https://www.historians.org/
publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/december-2009/debating-the-past-
academic-and-popular-histories-in-india).
3. In that perspective,  it  should be read along with others from this special  issue,  especially
Corinne  Lefèvre’s  (https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/6728)  and  Audrey  Truschke’s
(https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/6636) contributions. 
4. For an account of the ASI’s first decades of existence, see Singh (2004). 
5. This explains why the Indus Valley Civilization is also known as the Harappan Civilization and
its inhabitants are called the Harappans.
6. For example, Lahiri (1998). 
7. Among these tropes, one can mention the idea that the Indian mind is ahistorical, as well as
the division of Indian history into Hindu, Muslim, and British periods and its approach in terms
of decline and corruption—to which the colonial power supposedly put an end. 
8. Rama Mantena (2012) showed that the British kept Indian antiquarians out of the scholarly
sphere and intellectual networks during a great part of the nineteenth century. It was only in the
latter part of the century that Indian antiquarians and archaeologists came to be fully considered
as scholars by colonial administrators. 
9. Guha notably mentioned the works of Dilip Kumar Chakrabarti, who has written extensively
on the history of South Asian archaeology. See Chakrabarti (2003).
10. Varghese,  Rachel.  2018.  “Digging for  a  Hindu Nation.”  The London School  of  Economics  and
Political Science Blog, May 10. Retrieved on December 3, 2020 (https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/
2018/05/10/digging-for-the-hindu-nation/).
11. He had earlier been involved in the project on the archaeology of Mahabharata sites.
12. More than 20 authors contributed to this 574-page-long report. 
13. Ashish Avikunthak is also a filmmaker. He is also known as Ashish Chadha, whose work on
Sarasvati river has been of great help in the drafting of this article.
14. Avikunthak was doing fieldwork at Dholavira at the end of 2003. There he met with several
people  who  had  been  working  at  Ayodhya  (officers,  draftsmen,  photographers,  and
archaeologists of the ASI). They had signed a High Court order prohibiting them from talking
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15. A Court’s charge of contempt was directed at Ratnagar and Mandal in 2011 in relation with
their 2007 book and unsold copies were withdrawn from circulation (Varghese 2019:93).
16. See Thapar, Romila. 2010. “The Verdict on Ayodhya: A Historian’s Perspective.” The Hindu,
October  2,  updated  October  26,  2016.  Retrieved  on  December  3,  2020  (https://
www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/The-verdict-on-Ayodhya-a-historians-perspective/
article15523346.ece).
17. For examples,  see Lefèvre’s article in the present issue (https://journals.openedition.org/
samaj/6728).
18. For a short account of the Hindutva narrative of Indian history, see Thapar (2000).
19. One example is the work entitled A Discourse on Indo-European Languages and Culture (2005),
edited by Daya Nath Tripathi. It derived from the Seminar on the Homeland of Indo-European
Languages and Culture organized in 2002 by the Indian Council for Historical Research and the
Centre  for  the  Study  of  Indian  Tradition.  Stating  that  “some  contributors  to  the  volume,
including archaeologists with claims to academic distinction, appear to have become interested
in  Aryans  only  recently,”  Ratnagar (2007)  raised  the  following  question:  “did  the  scholars
succumb to the temptations of political patronage and rush to discover the indigenous origins of
the Aryans?” (P. 372)
20. To undertake excavations at a site of historical importance, for instance, one must obtain
permission from the Central Advisory Board of Archaeology, which is constituted by the Minister
of Culture and the ASI. 
21. This theory held “that the constitutive event for Indian civilization, the Big Bang through
which  it  came  into  being,  was  the  clash  between  invading,  fair-skinned,  civilized  Sanskrit-
speaking Aryans and dark-skinned, barbarous aborigines” (Trautmann 1997:194). In addition to
Aryans and Dravidians, a third group emerged, based on the identification of Munda languages.
Their speakers, the Kolarians, appeared in colonial ethnology as the main rivals of Dravidians as
the subcontinent’s autochthons.
22. Harappan  chronology  seemed  to  push  back  the  limits  of  Indian  history  by  at  least  a
millennium.  There  is  today  a  consensus  on  three  phases  of  Harappan  chronology:  Early
Harappans (3300-2600 BCE), Mature Harappans (2600-1900 BCE), and Late Harappans (1900-1300
BCE). 
23. The term “Sangam” applies to ancient academies of poets and scholars active around the city
of Madurai. It is used to refer to a corpus of Tamil ancient literature and also to the period in
which it is supposed to have been composed or compiled. The chronology is debated, but it has
been assumed to span from the second century BCE to the third century BCE.
24. The time period during which Indo-Aryans and Harappans may have overlapped (1700-1300
BCE) is very short (Chadha 2011:59). There are methodological problems as well, since sources are
incomplete  in  both  cases.  The  culture  of  the  Harappans  is  known  through  numerous
archaeological records, but there are still uncertainties on their language and religious and social
life, on account of the difficulties for deciphering their script. As for Indo-Aryans, sources are
mainly  textual—which  explains  why  the  date  of  their  arrival  in  India,  based  mainly  on
philological analysis of the Rig Veda, remains conjectural and relative (Chadha 2011:58–9). This
asymmetry  in  sources  has  made  it  easier  for  Hindutva  supporters  to  pretend  to  identify
equivalences between Harappan archaeology and Vedic literature.
25. The culture of the horse is associated with speakers of Indo-European languages. 
26. S. R. Rao published his theory in The Decipherment of the Indus Script (1982).
27. A  few  examples  are  Deo  and  Kamath (1993);  Rajaram (1993);  Frawley (1994);  Danino  and
Nahar (1996).
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This article deals with the relationship between Hindu nationalism and archaeology in India from
the end of the twentieth century onwards. Archaeology has been closely linked to the political
sphere since the nineteenth century, in particular through the existence of a state organization
such as  the Archaeological  Survey of  India.  Organizations belonging to the Hindutva nebula,
notably the BJP, started to resort largely to archaeology’s legitimizing discourse in the late 1980s
and 1990s. They have turned it into a powerful political and ideological tool since then, using it to
bolster their politics of exclusion. Archaeological data have enabled them to materialize their
theses on identity and nation into actual places and objects and thus give them the appearance of
empirical and scientific facts. Distortion and creation of archaeological evidence have become
current practices  so as  to  fit  and promote the Hindutva agenda,  as  shown in two cases:  the
Ayodhya dispute and the controversies on origins, both being part of the Hindutva project to
define the Indian nation as Hindu and confer upon modern Indians autochthonous ancestors, in
contrast to Muslims.
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